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Simple efficient decoders for quantum key distribution over quantum repeaters with
encoding
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1School of Electronic and Electrical Engineering, University of Leeds, Leeds, LS2 9JT, U.K.
(Dated: March 13, 2021)
We study the implementation of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems over quantum repeater
infrastructures. We particularly consider quantum repeaters with encoding and compare them with
probabilistic quantum repeaters. To that end, we propose two decoder structures for encoded
repeaters that not only improve system performance but also make the implementation aspects easier
by removing two-qubit gates from the QKD decoder. By developing several scalable numerical and
analytical techniques, we then identify the resilience of the setup to various sources of error in gates,
measurement modules, and initialization of the setup. We apply our techniques to three- and five-
qubit repetition codes and obtain the normalized secret key generation rate per memory per second
for encoded and probabilistic quantum repeaters. We quantify the regimes of operation, where one
class of repeater outperforms the other, and find that there are feasible regimes of operation where
encoded repeaters—based on simple three-qubit repetition codes—could offer practical advantages.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Bg
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum repeaters (QRs) are among the key technolo-
gies that need to be developed to enable the quantum
internet [1]. Their full implementation is, nevertheless,
a daunting task, which requires progress in both exper-
imental and theoretical fronts. An interesting avenue to
pursue is to look at simple repeater structures and try to
optimize their performance to offer tangible benefits. In
this work, we expand on the repeater-based quantum key
distribution (QKD) system studied in [2], and propose
alternative decoder structures that not only improve sys-
tem performance, but also simplify its implementation.
We also develop reliable approximation techniques that
enable us to calculate the key rate at high nesting levels.
All these will be put together to benchmark this class of
quantum repeaters against alternative fully probabilistic
settings [3, 4].
In this work, in the spirit of having an eye on near-
future implementations, our focus will be on the transi-
tion from probabilistic QRs [3–5] to deterministic QRs
that use quantum error correction techniques only for
their entanglement distillation (ED) operations [6–8]. In
such repeaters, encoded Bell states are created along ele-
mentary links, which will then be extended to the far ends
of the chain by performing entanglement swapping on en-
coded qubits. Such an entangled state is distilled along
the way by the measurement information obtained in the
entanglement swapping stage. In an earlier work [2] by
our group, we show that, so long as QKD is concerned,
error detection features of the code may be even more rel-
evant than its error correction functionalities. Our results
show that the majority of secret key bits come from the
portion of the data that corresponds to no detected er-
rors in either the repeater chain or decoder modules. By
using error detection as a post-selection mechanism, we
then improve the key rate considerably over cases when
the repeater chain and decoders are treated as a black-
box channel [9].
The work in [2] adopts a fully analytical approach to
accurately calculate the state shared by the users and
the secret key rate that can be extracted from it in the
standard mode of operation. It models the error in each
individual controlled not (cnot) gate, as well as the im-
perfections in the initially distributed Bell states and the
measurement modules. Direct calculation of the output
state, even in the case of a simple repetition code, turns
out, however, to be computationally challenging. In or-
der to resolve this issue, in [2], the authors use a lineariza-
tion technique in which they work out the output state
for each combination of input states at different elemen-
tary links. This reduces the computational complexity to
that of a four-qubit system at its core. By accounting for
the code structure, the authors then calculate the output
state for different input-state combinations to obtain the
final shared state between the two users. This accurate
approach shows that such systems are more resilient to
errors than previously thought [9], which can make their
near-future implementation more viable.
The approach in [2], while accurate and effective for
the first few nesting levels, will face computational prob-
lems at arbitrarily high nesting levels. The key reason
for this is that the number of terms that need to be cal-
culated will grow exponentially with the nesting level.
At some point, as an approximation method, we need
to drop the least significant terms and only keep those
that majorly contribute to the key rate. In this work, we
try to obtain a better understanding of such terms and
devise analytical and numerical techniques that help us
with reliable key rate calculations. This will then enable
us to consider and analyze larger codes, e.g., five-qubit
repetition codes, and compare them with simpler codes
such as three-qubit repetition codes.
Another source of complexity in the analysis presented
in [2] is the decoder module. The default decoder used
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in such settings is the one that reverses the entangling
operation applied at the encoding stage [9]. The decoder
module is then often composed of a number of untan-
gling cnot gates between different pairs of input qubits,
followed by syndrome measurement and correction oper-
ations. Depending on the size of the employed code, the
error analysis of the decoder part can become compu-
tationally complex. More importantly, the use of many
erroneous cnot gates has an adverse impact on the key
rate as shown in [2]. This is particularly the case be-
cause the decoder modules are the last components in the
setup, therefore, errors occurred in this last stage may be
harder to pick up. In this work, we offer a remedy for the
above problems by introducing alternative decoder struc-
tures that only rely on single-qubit measurements. This
not only simplifies the QKD setup but also, by remov-
ing the major source of error from the decoding circuits,
results in better performance in many practical scenarios.
Here, we first establish which decoder modules perform
the best, and then, by developing several numerical and
analytical methodologies, we perform a key rate analy-
sis on QKD systems that are run over QRs with three-
and five-qubit repetition codes. We account for various
sources of error in the setup for each of the proposed
decoders. Our main contributions are as follows:
• We propose two alternative QKD decoder structures,
and their corresponding post-processing, that simplify
the setup and improve its performance.
• We identify the terms that significantly impact the se-
cret key generation rate, and then assess its dependence
on relevant error parameters.
• We obtain the optimum structure for the QR setup at
fixed distances, and the minimum requirements for the
system to offer a positive key rate, or a rate, in bit
per second per quantum memory, larger than that of a
probabilistic QR.
• We show that, in many practical regimes of opera-
tion, the simple three-qubit repetition code is our best
choice.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we de-
scribe the QKD setups of interest based on the repeater
protocol of Ref. [6] with four different decoder structures.
By considering relevant error models for different compo-
nents of the system, in Sec. III, we compare the secret
key rate for different QKD decoders in the case of nesting
level one for the QR setup. We then extend our results,
in Sec. IV, to higher nesting levels by proposing several
different approximation techniques. We study the depen-
dence of the secret key generation rate on different error
parameters and find the corresponding thresholds for ex-
tracting a nonzero secret key rate at different nesting
levels. In Sec. V, we consider the entanglement gener-
ation rate of the elementary links for probabilistic and
deterministic QRs, with and without multiplexing, and
combine those results with the results of the previous
section to obtain the total normalized secret key rates in
bits per second. We also illustrate the parameter regions
where one type of QR performs more efficiently than the
other. Finally, we conclude the paper in Sec. VI.
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
FIG. 1. The schematic of the QKD setup on a repeater
chain based on the three-qubit repetition code. The small
oval pairs represent bipartite entangled state prepared in ad-
vance. Using remote cnot gates, an encoded entangled state
is generated across elementary links, and stored in memories
represented by large ovals. The encoded entanglement is then
extended across the entire link by performing entanglement
swapping (ES) operations on the middle nodes. The two users
will then apply decoding operation on this state to generate
their raw key.
Figure 1 shows the schematic of the QKD system con-
sidered in this work. Here, we use a quantum repeater
with encoding [2, 6] to distribute entangled states in an
encoded form across the two ends of the link. We then
decode such states to share a raw key between the users,
Alice and Bob, from which a secret key can be extracted
using postprocessing techniques. Our objective is to
assess the performance of the above QKD system in
the nominal mode of operation where no eavesdropper
is present. In such a case, it is crucial to consider
errors that stem from imperfections in the system, three
major sources of which we consider in this work as follows
(1) Imperfections in initial Bell states: The origi-
nally distributed Bell states in the QR setup are modeled




(I4 − |φ+〉〈φ+|), (1)
where |φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉), with |0〉 and |1〉 represent-
ing the standard basis for a single qubit, and I4 is a 4×4
identity matrix.
(2) Two-qubit gate imperfections: The cnot gate
for a control qubit i and a target qubit j is modeled as
[10]




in)⊗ Ii,j , (2)
where ρin (ρout) is the input (output) before (after) the
cnot gate, and Ui,j represents the unitary operator cor-
responding to an ideal cnot gate. The error in this two-
qubit operation is modeled by a uniform depolarization
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of qubits i and j, represented by identity operator Ii,j ,
with probability β.
(3) Measurement imperfections: The projective
measurements to states |0〉 and |1〉 are, respectively, rep-
resented by
P0 = (1− δ)|0〉〈0|+ δ|1〉〈1| and
P1 = (1− δ)|1〉〈1|+ δ|0〉〈0|, (3)
where δ is the measurement error probability. Similar
measurement operators, P±, are used for projective mea-
surement in |±〉 = 1/
√
2(|0〉 ± |1〉) basis.
As in [2], here, we assume all single-qubit operations
are perfect and quantum memories with infinitely long
coherence times are available.
In our work, we mainly use the three-qubit repetition
code as an example to illustrate our proposed techniques,
where the logical qubits are encoded as
|0̃〉 = |000〉 and |1̃〉 = |111〉. (4)
Some of our proposed techniques are, nevertheless, ap-
plicable to larger codes as well. Here, as an additional
example, we also apply our analysis to the five-qubit rep-
etition code, where the logical qubits are encoded as
|0̃〉 = |00000〉 and |1̃〉 = |11111〉. (5)
This code can ideally correct up to two bit-flip errors, as
compared to one in the three-qubit case. The comparison
between the two codes allows us to learn how the inter-
play between noisy gates and stronger error-correction
features affects the performance of the QKD system.
In the following, we briefly explain the repeater model
and describe different decoding modules, used in Fig. 1,
that we analyze and compare in this work.
A. Quantum repeater with repetition codes
Here, we briefly review the protocol proposed in [6] in
the case of the three-qubit repetition code. The protocol
with five-qubit repetition code is constructed in a similar
way. For detailed description, please refer to [2].
The QR protocol operates in the following way. First,
the codeword states, 1√
2
(|0̃〉+|1̃〉) and |0̃〉, are locally pre-
pared, respectively, at the left and right memory banks
(large ovals in Fig. 1), and Bell pairs are distributed be-
tween auxiliary memories (represented by small ovals in
Fig. 1) of all elementary links. Using these distributed
Bell states, one can then implement remote cnot gates,
transversally, on main and auxiliary memories, after
which, the encoded entangled states 1√
2
(|0̃〉|0̃〉 + |1̃〉|1̃〉)
are ideally created across all elementary links. Next, we
perform entanglement swapping (ES) operations at all
intermediate stations to extend the entanglement over
the entire link. This, due to the transversality of the
employed code, is simply done by performing three in-
dividual Bell-state measurements (BSMs) on the corre-
sponding pairs of physical qubits. Finally, after all ES op-
erations, an encoded entanglement is ideally distributed
between the two end users. Depending on the application
in mind, the final encoded entangled state can be decoded
into a bipartite state as done in [2, 9], or be used directly
as we will introduce next. In all cases, some measurement
information needs to be passed to the users to identify
the relevant Pauli-frame rotation on the final state.
B. Decoder structures
FIG. 2. The schematic of different decoder structures con-
sidered in this paper: (a) the original decoder proposed in [2],
where a decoding circuit is used to generate a qubit, on which
a QKD measurement, either in Z or X basis, is performed.
The decoding circuit would generate syndrome data d, which
is used for state classification. (b) A modified version of the
decoder proposed in [9], which is very similar to (a) except
that the decoder measurement outcome d is not used for clas-
sification. They still use the information in m in their key rate
extraction. Note that, in both (a) and (b), Eve can control
the decoder module, but has to pass some measurement data
to users. (c) First alternative decoder, proposed in this work,
where users directly measure the three qubits either all in Z
basis or in X basis. They use majority (parity) rules, in Z
(X) basis, to decode the key bit. (d) Our second alternative
decoder, which is very similar to (c), except that in the Z
basis a perfect match 111 (000) is mapped to bit 1 (0). In (c)
and (d), we assume Alice and Bob have control over the final
set of memories in their secure box.
Here, we consider four different decoder modules for
the QR-QKD setup considered in this work. Figure 2
shows the schematic of these decoders. In the first two
decoders, Alice and Bob use the biased version of the
entanglement-based BBM92 protocol [11, 12] by apply-
ing QKD measurements on a bipartite state obtained via
a decoding circuit. This circuit can in principle belong
to a third, untrusted, party, hence Alice and Bob do not
need to characterize this device in decoders 1 and 2. Its
operation is based on reversing the entangling operation
applied at the encoding stage. This type of decoder may
also find applications in non-QKD scenarios. Figure 2(a)
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shows the decoder setup used in [2], hereafter we refer to
as decoder 1, in which, using cnot gates, we first untan-
gle the encoded entangled state, and then perform QKD
measurements on the resulting bipartite state. In [2], it
is shown that the measurement information obtained at
the ES, m, and decoding, d, stages can be used to sepa-
rate the type of entangled states shared by the users, and
consequently obtain higher key rates overall. In decoder
1, we assume that the information in m and d is fully
used to take advantage of this classification. The second
decoder, decoder 2, is shown in Fig. 2(b), where, as in de-
coder 1, we also apply error-correction operation to the
resulting bipartite state. This decoder does not, how-
ever, pass the information obtained at the decoder stage
to the user ends, and, in that sense, treats the decoder
setup as a black box. Both these decoders are studied in
the earlier work by our group [2], where we show that,
the particular case where no error is detected at decoding
and ES stages is the major contributor to the key rate.
In this work, we try to account for specific require-
ments of the QKD system to possibly come up with sim-
pler, and as turns out more efficient, decoders. There
are several observations that lead us to these alternative
structures. First, we note that, so long as QKD is con-
cerned, the purpose of the decoder module is to perform
measurements in two mutually unbiased bases. Secondly,
physically speaking, the three quantum memories in the
two end nodes of the repeater chain are practically held
in the secure boxes of Alice and Bob. The corresponding
error correction/detection operations can then be per-
formed by the two legitimate users, and not necessarily
a third party. Finally, at least in the case of repetition
codes, error correction/detection, or part of it, can po-
tentially be done as part of post-processing rather than
quantum mechanically.
Putting together the above points, in this work, we
propose two alternative decoders and compare their per-
formance with that of decoders 1 and 2. In both decoders,
Alice and Bob, instead of manipulating their three qubits
by quantum gates, directly measure them all in either X
or Z basis. The two users choose their own basis inde-
pendently, but randomly, according to the asymmetric
QKD protocols [12]. They then use classical postpro-
cessing to assign a certain bit to their raw key bit. In
decoder 3, shown in Fig. 2(c), we use the majority rule,
in Z basis, to replicate the error correction feature of
the code against bit-flip errors. For instance, a measure-
ment corresponding to |101〉 is mapped to bit 1. In that
sense, decoder 3 can be thought of as a simplified ver-
sion of decoder 2. In X basis, we map the measurement
outcomes that have an odd number of |+〉 states to bit
0, and all other measurement outcomes to bit 1. The
former (latter) corresponds to input states that result in
|+〉 (|−〉) states in the output of an ideal decoder 2. In
decoder 4, shown in Fig. 2(c), we additionally apply the
postselection rule proposed in [2], where, in Z basis, only
measurement outcomes corresponding to no errors, i.e.,
|000〉 or |111〉, is kept, and all other cases are discarded.
In X basis, we use the same parity rule as in decoder 3.
In both decoders 3 and 4, we use m to postselect only
cases where no error has been detected at the ES stage.
As compared to decoders 1 and 2, our alternative de-
coders 3 and 4 do not need to deal with the errors in
the decoder cnot gates. This certainly reduces some
sources of error in the decoder, which is a sensitive part
in the whole setup. Our classical postprocessing is not,
however, an exact replica of that of decoder 1 as we do
not use the information available in d for classification.
It will be interesting to see how the interplay between
these two factors spans out, as we investigate in the next
section.
III. SECRET KEY ANALYSIS FOR NESTING
LEVEL ONE
In this section, we discuss the performance of the QKD
system in Fig. 1 for different decoding structures of Fig. 2.
As the first step, we investigate the dependence of the se-
cret key generation rate in our QKD system on relevant
error parameters in the case of one repeater node, i.e.,
the first nesting level. To this end, we first calculate the
secret key generation rate per entangled state shared be-
tween Alice and Bob. In the asymptotic regime for an
efficient entanglement-based QKD protocol, this param-
eter, known as the secret fraction [9], is lower bounded
by [13]
r∞(eb, ep) = max{0, 1− h(eb)− h(ep)}, (6)
where h(p) = −plog2p− (1−p)log2(1−p) is the Shannon
binary entropy function, and eb and ep are, respectively,
the bit-flip and phase-flip error probability, or an upper
bound of which, in the Z basis.
To calculate the secret fraction, in [2], the authors de-
velop a technique by which they analytically calculate
the relevant density matrices from which the above er-
ror parameters can be calculated. Here, we use the same
methodology to obtain the joint state, ρ̃m, of the two
memory banks held by Alice and Bob, upon observing
the measurement outcome m at the ES stage, and the
joint state ρm,d, after the decoding circuit in decoder 1,
upon observing, in addition to m, the measurement out-
come d at the decoding stage. The states ρ̃m and ρm,d
can, respectively, be obtained using Eqs. (20) and (26)
in [2], with the corresponding probability of occurrence
denoted by pm and pm,d. In our calculations, we consider
a partially imperfect encoder, as modelled by Eq. (34) in
[2], where less significant cross terms are ignored. In the
following, we obtain the secret fraction for each of the
proposed decoders in the asymptotic regime, where an
infinite number of entangled states have been shared. As
mentioned before, we consider the normal mode of oper-
ation, where no eavesdropper is present, but we account
for the device imperfections as modelled in Sec. II.
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A. Decoder 1
In this decoder, the users take full advantage of m and
d to classify their entangled states as a function of these
two parameters, and extract a secret key separately from































The measurement operators in Eq. (8) are defined ac-
cording to Eq. (3) with additional superscripts to specify
the user. Note that, in this case, the phase-error rate
is effectively the same as the bit-flip error rate in the X
basis.
B. Decoder 2
In the second decoder, the information in d is not used
for classification, but only, internally, for error correction.
For each m, the state on which QKD measurements are





where pd|m = pm,d/pm. The total secret fraction in this







































Decoder 3 uses a direct measurement on the three
qubits held by each user to specify the raw key. Be-
fore calculating the corresponding error parameters, it is
then important to establish the security of this structure
and how we can bound the bit error rate and the phase
error rate in Z basis. This has been done in Appendix
A, where we show that, in the ideal case, the measure-
ment operators modelling decoder 3 are identical to that
of decoder 2. We can then use a similar security proof to
relate the phase error rate in the Z basis to the bit error
rate in the X basis. In the imperfect implementation of
either decoders, we end up overestimating both parame-
ters, which is still in line with the lower bound nature of
Eq. (6). With this in mind, the total secret fraction for































P̃0 = P000 + P100 + P010 + P001,
P̃1 = P111 + P110 + P101 + P011,
P̃+ = P+++ + P+−− + P−+− + P−−+,
P̃− = P−−− + P−++ + P+−+ + P++− (14)
being, respectively, the corresponding measurement op-
erators to bit 0 and 1 in Z basis and X basis, where
Pijk = Pi ⊗ Pj ⊗ Pk. Note that the majority rule is used
in the Z basis.
D. Decoder 4
Decoder 4 is very similar to decoder 3 with an addi-
tional post-processing step in which, in the Z basis, we
only accept the cases where either three 1s or three 0s
have been obtained. This is inspired by the observation
in [2] that the output with no error in the decoding stage
is the main contributor to the key rate. In this case, the
bit error rate in the X basis is not necessarily an upper
bound on the phase error rate for the post-selected data
in the Z basis. But, we can consider the worst case sce-
nario by assuming that all the errors that we observe in
the X basis correspond to the post-selected part of the
data in the Z basis. In this case, the total secret fraction


























is the success probability for the post-selection step, i.e.,




















The final equation gives an upper bound on the phase
error rate in the Z basis as explained above.
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FIG. 3. Secret fraction for different decoder (Dec) structures
versus (a) gate error probability β at F0 = 1 and δ = 0, and
(b) measurement error probability δ at F0 = 1 and β = 0. In
the curves corresponding to perfect decoders, all error param-
eters assume their ideal values just in the decoder module; the
corresponding value in the rest of the system is as the graph
shows.
E. Comparison between different decoders
Now that we have all the ingredients to analyze all de-
coder settings, we can compare them in terms of their re-
silience to different error parameters. In [2], the authors
have already established that, by properly using the in-
formation available in d, decoder 1 outperforms decoder
2; please see Fig. 4 in [2]. Decoder 3, in the ideal case
when there is no error in the decoder, should be identical
to decoder 2, but, in the case of erroneous cnot gates, it
is expected that it outperforms decoder 2. It would not
be trivial, however, if decoder 3 can outperform decoder
1 as well. Decoder 4 also, by postselecting in the Z basis,
can reduce the bit-flip error rate, as compared to decoder
3, but its phase-error rate bound in Eq. (18) is not neces-
sarily tight. We have to therefore investigate if decoder
4 can ever surpass decoder 3 in terms of performance. In
this section, we try to answer these questions.
Figures 3(a) and (b) show the performance of different
decoders, respectively, as a function of gate error prob-
ability β, at F0 = 1 and δ = 0, and measurement error
probability δ, at F0 = 1 and β = 0. In both cases, we
have also included several curves corresponding to per-
fect decoders as well. For instance, the perfect decoder
in Fig. 3(a) uses perfect cnot gates as well as ideal mea-
surement modules in its decoder circuit, whereas in the
rest of the system β can take nonzero values. We make
several interesting observations from these figures, which
we summarize below:
• Observation 1: Decoders 3 (orange curves) and 4
(green curves) show better performance than decoders
1 (dashed black) and 2 (dashed blue), when the im-
perfections in the decoder circuit are considered. In
Fig. 3(a), it is mainly the cnot errors that make the
difference. Without cnot and measurement errors,
even decoder 2 performs better than an imperfect de-
coder 1. This is an interesting result, which shows that
the effect of cnot errors in the decoder circuit can
trump the benefits we may get from knowing the value
of d in decoder 1. It then follows that decoder 3 is also
better than imperfect decoder 1. At δ = 0, this is be-
cause decoder 3 is identical to a perfect decoder 2 (see
Appendix A). But, interestingly, this also holds even
for nonzero values of δ as shown in Fig. 3(b). As a re-
sult, the maximum allowed value for β roughly moves
from 0.03-0.06, for decoders 1 and 2, to 0.08, for de-
coders 3 and 4. A similar behavior is seen in Fig. 3(b),
where maximum allowed value for δ roughly increases
from 0.02 to 0.035.
• Observation 2: We notice that, the classification ver-
sus d could still play a role if all sources of error in the
decoder could diminish. For instance in both figures,
the curves corresponding to perfect decoder 1 offer the
best performance. Also, it can be seen that, when there
are no error parameters considered for decoders at all,
decoders 2 and 3 perform similarly as expected by the
results of Appendix A. That said, in practice, achieving
this level of perfection may not be possible, hence, so
far as QKD is concerned as an application, decoders 3
and 4 are the preferred option, which not only improve
the performance, but are also easier to implement.
• Observation 3: In smaller error regions, decoder 3
performs slightly better than decoder 4, but eventually
decoder 4, because of its postselection rule [2], is more
tolerant to errors. The good thing is that decoder 4,
in terms of hardware, is exactly the same as decoder 3,
and the postselection rule can be applied by software in
the postprocessing steps. It is therefore feasible that,





∞ , and pick the higher rate. In this work, the
secret fraction calculated for this setup hereafter is the






• Observation 4: It is interesting that, in Fig. 3(b),
where β = 0, decoder 3 still outperforms decoder 2
in the case of imperfect measurement modules. One
may think that, given that both decoders rely on three
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FIG. 4. Secret fraction ropt
∞
versus (a) β, at δ = 1− F0 = 0;
(b) 1 − F0, at δ = β = 0; (c) δ, at β = 1 − F0 = 0; and (d)
β, at δ = 0.01 and 1 − F0 = 0. The curves labelled by good
correspond to the output states where no error is detected at
the ES stage, whereas the bad curves are for the output states
where some errors are detected at the ES stage. The curves
labeled by total are the weighted sum of good and bad terms
as given by Eq. (12) and Eq. (15).
single-qubit measurement operations, the secret frac-
tion should be the same in both cases. Interestingly,
this is not the case, and the reason for that is somehow
because of the dependence of eb parameters on the lo-
cation of the error as we explain next. In decoder 2, to
the first order approximation, e
(2)
b is proportional to δ,
corresponding to an error in the measurement on the
top qubit. In decoder 3, however, we need to make at
least two errors in order to have a bit flip, which means
that, to the first-order approximation, e
(3)
b is propor-
tional to δ2. This justifies why decoder 3 outperforms
decoder 2 even if β = 0. More generally, in our calcu-
lations, we realize that the position where the bit-flip
occurs affects the value of e
(3)
b in an asymmetric way. It
is important then that we consider all terms in Eq. (13)
in calculating e
(3)
b . Note that the terms contributing to
e
(3)
p are mostly symmetric in terms of their subscripts
as well as over Alice and Bob.
We finish this section by extending one of the key re-
sults of [2], in using error detection as an effective post-
selection tool, to setups that use decoders 3 and 4. In
Fig. 4, we have plotted ropt∞ versus different error param-
eters, alongside the contributions from good states, cor-
responding to no error at the ES stage, and bad states,
for which some error has been detected. We get very
similar results to [2], where the total secret fraction is ei-
ther equal to the contribution from good states, or almost
equal to it. This observation allows us in the next section
to only focus on the good states, when we calculate the
rate at higher nesting levels.
IV. EXTENSION TO HIGHER-NESTING
LEVELS
In order to estimate the secret key rate at higher nest-
ing levels, we are going to use the same approach as pro-
posed in [2], but we modify it, using numerical and ana-
lytical approximations, so that we can manage its com-
putational complexity. The key ingredient needed to cal-
culate the key rate in the case of decoders 3 and 4 is the
multipartite entangled state ρ̃m. In this section, as ex-
plained before, we only account for the contribution from
good states, and, as a representative, we only consider
one particular good outcome among all that correspond
to no error at the ES stage. We denote the correspond-
ing output state to this outcome by ρ̃good. Once ρ̃good is
obtained, we can use Eq. (12) and Eq. (15) to obtain a
tight lower bound on the secret fraction by ignoring the
contribution from bad states. Our objective here is to get
a realistic picture of what our encoded setup can achieve,
and to what degree it is resilient to system errors. Ex-
act lower bounds, which can securely be obtained in an
experimental setup, are not then necessarily needed, and
instead, we use tight estimates on such lower bounds to
gain insight into system operation and its limitations.
In [2], the authors develop an analytical approach to
find the joint multipartite state between Alice and Bob.
In their proposed technique, they break down the initial
state of the system to its core components, and apply
possibly erroneous gate and measurement operations to
each possible input combination separately. By using the
traversality of the employed code, they then obtain ρ̃good,
while avoiding the computational complexity correspond-
ing to large multi-qubit systems. Instead, they just need
to deal with a four-qubit system at a time. The number
of the input terms they need to consider, however, grows
exponentially with the nesting level, and practically it
is very difficult to use their approach in full for nesting
levels greater than three. More precisely, the entangled
state between memory banks A and B, held, respectively,











where j = [j1, . . . , j2n ] and k = [k1, . . . , k2n ] with each
component taking a binary value. ρj,kAiBi is the joint
state of the ith memory in banks A and B if the ini-







init = |jl〉〈kl| ⊗ |0〉〈0| is
the initial state of elementary link l. In [2], the au-
thors use a recursive technique to write ρj,kAiBi , at nest-







level n − 1, with j′ = [j1, . . . , j2n−1 , k1, . . . , k2n−1 ] and
k′ = [j2n−1+1, . . . , j2n , k2n−1+1, . . . , k2n ], going back to
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can be calculated for each elementary link.
As can be seen in Eq. (19), the number of terms that
need to be calculated for nesting level n is 22
n+1
. This
is despite the fact that we already limit ourselves to a
particular measurement outcome. For instance, at n = 3,
the number of terms is 216 = 65, 536, which means that
our core 4-qubit calculations has to be run this many
times in order to get all possible outputs. This may still
sound manageable, but certainly not scalable especially
if we are dealing with the analytical form of each term.
In this work, we develop several approximation tech-
niques to handle the computational complexity in
Eq. (19). By carefully analyzing each component, we find
the terms that contribute negligibly to the secret frac-
tion and can therefore be omitted. The principle behind
our approximation techniques is to break the exponential
growth trend and cut off the number of terms that has to
be considered at each nesting level, thus improving the
calculation speed dramatically. This has been achieved
via analytical and numerical techniques as explained be-
low. Using such techniques, we can also analyse larger
codes in our setting, an example of which is given at the
end of this section.
A. Analytical approximations
In this section, we investigate three approximation
techniques. Figure 5 gives a comparison between these
three techniques and that of exact results for n = 1, 2, 3
as a function of β. Our approximation method (i) is a
crude one, in which, at each nesting level, we only keep
four combination terms in which the initial state of all
elementary links is assumed to be the same, i.e., jl (kl) is
the same for all values of l and takes one of the possible
values of 0 and 1. In other words, j = 0,1 and k = 0,1.
The results, while not matching the exact curves, follows
the trend very closely, at each nesting level, for small to
moderate values of β. It suggests that, in this region,
the contribution from the four terms with identical input
states at each elementary link is the major contributor
to the key rate, and all other input combinations can
somehow be neglected. Approximation (i), nevertheless,
cannot correctly predict the maximum value of β at each
nesting level, and only provides an upper bound on that.
Our approximation techniques (ii) and (iii), respectively,
correspond to the first-order and second-order approxi-
mations of the output state ρ̃good, but with some nuances.
The question is, as we deal, at lower nesting levels, with
matrices corresponding to ρj,kAiBi , which of such matri-
ces to keep at higher nesting levels, and which elements
within each matrix needs to be accounted for. Note that
each ρj,kAiBi represents a two-qubit system, hence can be
FIG. 5. Secret fraction ropt
∞
versus gate error probability β
for the first three nesting levels under three different approxi-
mation methods, with initial fidelity F0 = 1 and measurement
error probability δ = 0.
represented by a 4 × 4 matrix. In method (ii), starting
from nesting level one, we keep all components ρj,kAiBi for
which their matrix representation has at least one ele-
ment of order β, or lower. We also equate to zero all
elements of such a matrix that are of the order of β2
or higher. Please note that if an element has terms on
the order of β or one, that element would be fully kept.
We observe strange instability in our calculations, when
β is moderately large, if we do not keep the whole ele-
ment, including all higher order terms, in such cases. As
a result of this purging, some combinations of j,k do not
contribute to either the summation at the current level or
as an input to next nesting levels. This makes the com-
putation workload considerably lighter. Approximation
method (iii) is very similar except that we keep matrices
that have elements of order O(βi), i ≤ 2. In such a case,
again, the full expression for the element is used even if
some parts of it is of higher order than two.
As can be seen in Fig. 5, approximation methods (ii)
and (iii) come very close to the exact results, with their
difference to each other and the exact results becomes
negligible at n = 3. It can then be concluded that either
of them would be sufficient to give us a tight estimate of
the key rate at high nesting levels. This could be because,
in our scheme, we only use good states for generating se-
cret key bits. The higher order error terms can result
in a larger number of errors, which would be harder to
remain unnoticed, in higher nesting levels, where quite a
few measurements are performed at the ES stage. This
would make the contribution from terms in higher or-
ders of β less important. These analytical approxima-
tions give us some useful insight into which components
contribute the most to the key rate. With this in mind,
in the next section, we introduce a numerical approxi-
mation technique, by which we can even consider higher
nesting levels.
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FIG. 6. Secret fraction ropt
∞
for three-qubit repetition code,
as a function of gate error probability β for different nest-
ing levels, using our numerical approximation technique at
Ntop = 20, with initial fidelity F0 = 1 and measurement error
probability δ = 0. Here, the errors in the encoding and de-
coding circuits are included. The exact simulation results for
the first three nesting levels are shown (solid yellow lines) as
comparison.
B. Numerical approximations
For arbitrarily high nesting levels, while the analytical
approximation techniques discussed previously are still
applicable, the simulation speed is still severely limited
by the complexity of the analytical expressions after each
ES operation. Numerical techniques will then be required
to find the output state in such cases. Here, based on
what we learned from our analytical techniques, we pro-
pose a numerical approximation method, which is both
reliable and fast. In our method, starting from nesting
level one, we use the following procedure
1. Calculate ρj,kAiBi for all relevant combinations of j,k
that we have kept in the previous nesting level (i.e.,
all, at n = 1).
2. Each ρj,kAiBi is represented by a 4 × 4 matrix. We
collate all 16 elements for all states calculated in
step 1, and sort them in the decreasing order based
on their absolute values. We keep the top Ntop
elements, and equate the rest to zero.
3. We identify combinations j,k whose corresponding
matrices have at least one nonzero element after
step 2. We keep these states, and ignore the rest.
4. Repeat the above steps for the next nesting level,
until reaching the desired one.
In Fig. 6, we plot the secret fraction as a function of
gate error probability β for up to seven nesting levels,
using the above algorithm at Ntop = 20, with initial fi-
delity F0 = 1 and measurement error probability δ = 0.
We also present the exact simulation results (solid yel-
low lines) for the first three nesting levels. The value of
Ntop = 20 is chosen such that the results of our numer-
ical approximation match the exact calculation results
with high accuracy. The results of the previous section
regarding the higher order terms being negligible at high
nesting levels give us some assurance that the numerical
results remain accurate for n > 3 as well. We have in-
cluded the results for up to seven nesting levels because,
even for an elementary distance of 20 km, this already
covers 10,000 km of distance for the repeater chain. This
is the order of magnitude that we need for continental-
scale quantum repeaters. We come back to this point
in Sec. V. An interesting observation in Fig. 6 is that,
even at n = 7, the required threshold for β is on the
order of 1%, which keeps the prospect of implementing
such systems, at long distances, promising. For instance,
quantum memories based on trapped ions or vacancy cen-
ters in diamond or silicon mostly meet the requirements
for this setup, and can be used in early demonstrations
[14–19].
From Fig. 6, we can obtain the maximum gate error β
that can be tolerated for extracting a non-zero secret key
rate at different nesting levels. In Table II of Ref. [20],
a similar analysis is performed for the original quantum
repeater protocol [10], also known as the BDCZ protocol
after its authors. Note that in [20], the authors use the
gate quality pG = 1 − β as a figure of merit. Compared
with their results, we notice that the quantum repeater
protocol in the present work is more tolerant to gate er-
rors at nesting levels n ≥ 3. At low nesting levels, the
BDCZ quantum repeater may, however, work better, but
considering that the memory decoherence is expected to
hit harder the BDCZ protocol than the encoded repeater,
it is likely that the latter can perform better at lower nest-
ing levels as well, once we consider decoherence effects.
This result can be taken as an improvement of the results
obtained in Ref. [9], where the authors conclude that the
encoded QR is less tolerant against gate errors than the
original QR. The change in conclusion could be mainly
due to the more accurate modelling of gates and measure-
ment modules, in our work, as well as the improvement
that we get because of our classification technique, i.e.,
separating the cases for which no error has been detected,
at the ES stage, from the rest.
Finally, it would be interesting to find out how com-
putation time is improved using either of our analytical
or numerical approximation techniques. Table I shows
the time consumed in each technique, including the ex-
act analytical approach, in order to obtain the secret key
fraction, at different nesting levels, in a nominal setting
corresponding to Figs. 5 and 6. That is, we use cnot
error rate, β, as a variable, and fix the initial fidelity at
F0 = 1 and measurement error probability at δ = 0. The
time shown may change if we change the parameter set-
ting, and, in any case, they mainly represent the order
of magnitude suitable for comparison, as the actual time
may depend on the processor used and/or other condi-
tions of the computing device. In our case, we have used
a personal Mac machine, and we have run the simulations
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TABLE I. The simulation time for calculating the secret key
fraction for different methods: Exact analytical solution, an-
alytical approximation method (iii) in Sec. IVA, and the nu-
merical approximation method at Ntop = 20. Here we use
three-qubit repetition codes with β as the variable, while the
other two parameters are error-free. The time shown is the
average time using a personal computer. The Numerical col-
umn represents the computation time per point.
Nesting level Exact Analytical (iii) Numerical
n = 1 ∼1.5 s ∼1.5 s ∼0.06 s
n = 2 ∼3.1 s ∼2.7 s ∼0.12 s
n = 3 ∼65.8 s ∼9.2 s ∼0.61 s
n = 4 >54852.2 s1 ∼106.6 s ∼2.4 s
n = 5 N/A N/A ∼5.3 s
n = 6 N/A N/A ∼11.6 s
n = 7 N/A N/A ∼31.4 s
1 We stopped the simulation at this point without getting the
final results.
several times, under similar conditions, to get an average
value for each point. Based on the numerical figures in
Table. I, we notice that, as expected, the computation
time scales exponentially in almost all cases, but there is
a huge difference in the slope of the growth in the three
cases, where for the exact analytical technique, even at
n = 4, we could not find the final answer after spending
over 15 hours, whereas for the analytical approximation
approach, we obtain the answer in less than two minutes.
This time was only around 2 s per point in the numerical
approximation case. In the end, although at low nesting
levels, the computation time is about the same for all
schemes, the only solution that can practically be used
to assess the performance in continental-scale scenarios,
or for larger codes, is the numerical one. Note that the
time figures shown in the numerical case are per calcu-
lated point. The total time needed would then need to
be multiplied by the number of points we are interested
in. But, this additional factor would only affect the total
computation time linearly.
Now that we have sufficient tools to analyze our sys-
tem, we can investigate the dependence of the key rate
on another important design aspect, i.e., the employed
code itself. So far, we have only dealt with the case of
the three-qubit repetition code. This code is one of the
simplest, and, therefore, weakest possible codes when it
comes to error correction. One may wonder, if we use
stronger codes, whether we get any improvement in sys-
tem performance. We should bear in mind that larger
codes require more gates for their encoding and decod-
ing, and their additional error correction capabilities may
be countered by the increase in the encoding errors. In
the case of decoders 3 and 4, which we consider here,
some key sources of error at the decoder are eliminated,
but it would still be interesting to see how larger codes
behave, as we investigate next.
1. The effect of the employed code
In this section, we find the secret fraction for a five-
qubit repetition codes as described in Eq. (5). We will
investigate if the ability of this code in correcting for
up to two errors would be helpful for the QKD setup
considered in this work. The setup and the protocol
used is very similar to that of three-qubit code with
certain obvious changes for the five-qubit case. For in-
stance, the initial codeword state for node A, in Fig. 1,
is now ideally given by (|0̃〉A + |1̃〉A)/
√
2, which can
be achieved by applying four cnot gates on the state
1√
2
(|0〉A1+|1〉A1)|0〉A2 |0〉A3 |0〉A4 |0〉A5 , with Ai represent-
ing the individual memories in bank A. Similar to what
we have considered for the three-qubit repetition code,
after accounting for errors in such gates, the codeword

















contains the terms which are in the tensor product form
of having the same input qubit in all rows. The state
ρotherA , which contains many more combinations of input
states, is lengthy and will not be given explicitly here.
Based on the observation in [2], where it is shown that
ρcodeA part plays the major role in determining the secret
fraction, here we only consider Eq. (22) and neglect the
other terms. This crucially simplifies the code for further
simulation.
Figure 7 shows the secret fraction as a function of gate
error β for QRs with five-(dashed lines) and three-qubit
repetition codes (solid lines), at F0 = 1 and δ = 0, up
to n = 3. We notice that, initially, the protocol with
three-qubit repetition code generates more keys. This is
expected as, at low values of β, there are not that many
errors and the three-qubit code can detect them simi-
larly to the five qubit code, without imposing additional
encoding errors. However, with the increase in β, the
protocol with five-qubit repetition codes begins to show
advantage over the three-qubit code since it can tolerate
more errors. We have to wait and see if this possible ad-
vantage at higher error rates is of any practical relevance.
We give an answer to this question in the following sec-
tion.
V. SECRET KEY RATE FOR THE REPEATER
CHAIN
The most practical figure of merit for a QKD system is
often represented by its total secret key generation rate,
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FIG. 7. Secret fraction ropt
∞
of QRs encoded with three-
qubit repetition code (solid lines) and five-qubit repetition
code (dashed lines) for the first three nesting levels as a func-
tion of gate error probability β, with initial fidelity F0 = 1
and measurement error probability δ = 0. We have used our
numerical approximation method at Ntop = 20.
R, in bits per unit of time. Thus far, we have only fo-
cused on the secret fraction, which gives us the proba-
bility of generating a secret key once a multipartite en-
tangled state is shared with the users. In order to obtain
the total secret key generation rate, we need to multiply
the secret fraction by the entanglement generation rate
γ. In this section, we account for the latter factor, in
two possible implementations of the setup in Fig. 1, as
well as the corresponding fully probabilistic quantum re-
peater setups. This allows us then to specify the regions
in which each setup could offer a better performance.
In all cases considered in this section, we assume that
a DLCZ-like protocol [3] is used to distribute entangle-
ment over the elementary links. In this scheme, entan-
gled memory-photon pairs are generated simultaneously
at each elementary node, the photons are coupled into
optical fibers and interfere in the middle of each segment.
A successful BSM, which is classically communicated to
the two end nodes of the elementary link, projects the
corresponding memory qubits into an entangled states.
In our work, we assume that the success probability for







where p represents the probability of generating the ini-
tial memory-photon entanglement and the coupling effi-
ciency of a photon into the optical fiber, ηd accounts for
the detector efficiency and its corresponding coupling ef-
ficiency, and ηch = exp[− L02Latt ] is the transmitivity of a
photon through half of the elementary link with length
L0. Latt is the attenuation length of the channel, where
for standard optical fibers is around 22 km. Also, ignor-
ing the measurement time and the interaction time be-
tween memories and photons, each entangling attempt
as above would take
T0 = L0/c, (24)
which includes the initial transmission of the photon and
the classical communication to verify the success, with
c = 2× 105 km/s being the speed of light in fiber. With
the successful probability for generating one Bell pair be-
ing P0, the average waiting time for generating N Bell
pairs is given by
< T >N= T0ZN (P0) (25)
where ZN (P0) is the average number of trials required to












Based on the above entanglement distribution proto-
col, we now consider several QR protocols based on error
correction, with and without multiplexing, and proba-
bilistic ES operations, and compare them together.
A. Encoded QR with no multiplexing
Here, we consider, the setup in Fig. 1, with minimal
number of logical quantum memories, that is, 2q per
memory bank for a q-qubit repetition code with q = 3, 5.
The factor two accounts for the memories used for initial
entanglement distribution (small ovals) and those used
for the remaining steps (large ovals). The total number
of memories, at nesting level n, in the setup is then given
by 2n+2q. In this setting, whenever, at any intermediate
node, the initial entanglement over its adjacent links are
prepared, we can go ahead and perform the correspond-
ing ES operation at that node. By this technique, on
average it will take ZNdet(P0), for Ndet = q × 2n, until
we have all elementary links entangled, and done the cor-
responding ES operations. The entanglement generation
rate, i.e., the number of encoded entangled states shared





The subscript det refers to the deterministic QR con-
sidered in the present work. The normalized secret key










Note that, in practice, each physical memory module
may contain multiple logical qubits. For instance, for
nitrogen vacancy centers in diamond, both electronic and
nuclear spins can be used as a qubit. In such cases, the
normalized rate in Eq. (28) can be modified to account
for this factor.
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FIG. 8. Normalized secret key rates for the encoded QRs
with/without multiplexing for the first three nesting levels
as a function of the total distance, with initial fidelity F0 =
0.99, gate error probability β = 0.01 and measurement error
probability δ = 0.005. The secret key rate is calculated for
the better of decoders 3 and 4 at p = 0.5, ηd = 0.9, and
Latt =22 km using our numerical approximation technique at
Ntop = 20.
B. Encoded QR with multiplexing
With the probability for successfully generating an en-
tangled pair P0 being small, a large number of attempts
will be needed before one elementary link is ready for
use. One could, however, do this entangling process
in parallel across many pairs of memories. This mul-
tiplexing operation improves the rate and resilience to
decoherence [5, 23] at the price of requiring significantly
more physical resources to minimize the required tempo-
ral resources. Here, we consider the case where there are
a large number of memories Nm per station satisfying
NmP0 ≫ 1. Using this multiplexing technique, we can
ensure that, after every attempted cycle of duration T0,
there are enough entangled pairs generated to immedi-
ately perform the QR swapping and QKD measurement
operations. The entanglement generation rate, for this














In Fig. 8, we plot the normalized secret key rate for
QRs with 3-qubit repetition code with and without mul-
tiplexing as a function of the total distance Ltot = 2
nL0.
We assume an initial fidelity F0 = 0.99, gate error prob-
ability β = 0.01, and measurement error probability
δ = 0.005. As for other parameters, we have assumed
p = 0.5, which is achievable for cavity-enhanced memo-
ries [24], and ηd = 0.9 [25]. For the chosen parameters,
we can generate non-zero key rates up to the third nest-
ing level. Note that according to Fig. 8, the optimum
distance for elementary links is about 50 km. Since the
memory coherence time and dark count rate of detectors
are not taken into account in this analysis, we do not see
the typical cut-off security distance beyond which secure
key exchanges is not possible. It is expected that a co-
herence time on the order of 10T0 and 10 < T >Ndet are,
respectively, needed for the proper operation of the sys-
tem with and without multiplexing [26]. We notice that,
as expected, the multiplexing helps increase the secret
key rate. The higher the nesting level, the more visible
this increase is. But, even with multiplexing, the total
rate achievable by the system is rather low. For instance,
at a total distance of 800 km, we would need around 1000
quantum memories to obtain a total key rate on the or-
der of bits per second. This is comparable with what
one may achieve with probabilistic quantum repeaters.
Next, we will consider this class of quantum repeaters
for a more quantitative analysis.
C. Probabilistic quantum repeaters
The most feasible implementations of quantum re-
peaters rely on probabilistic operations for the initial en-
tanglement distribution as well as further ES operation
[27]. Initially proposed by Duan, Lukin, Cirac and Zoller
(DLCZ) [3], it soon found various alternatives [4, 28].
Here, we use a generic model for this class of quantum
repeaters to enable a fair comparison with encoded sys-
tems when it comes to QKD as an application. One key
difference is in the fact that the implementation of prob-
abilistic ES is not based on gate operations. Instead, a
probabilistic photonic ES can be achieved by converting
back the state of quantum memories to single photons
and then do BSMs on the corresponding photons. We
can therefore neglect all gate and measurement errors
in probabilistic repeaters, and only consider imperfec-
tions in the initially distributed Bell states. The main
drawback of such a protocol is that probabilistic BSMs
increase the waiting time and reduce the rate. The re-
silience to decoherence would also be lower, requiring co-
herence time on the order of 10× Ltot/c, because of ad-
ditional transmission delays, even if multiplexing is used
[26].
Based on above assumptions, in this work, the ES op-
eration is modelled as follows. If, by nesting level n, the
entangled states on ab and cd links is diagonal in the
Bell basis and is given by ρab = ρcd = An|φ+〉〈φ+| +
Bn|φ−〉〈φ−| + Cn|ψ+〉〈ψ+| +Dn|ψ−〉〈ψ−|, the resulting
state between a and d after a BSM on b and c can still
be written in the Bell diagonal form with the following
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FIG. 9. Normalized secret key rates for QRs with encoding
(solid, three-qubit code) and probabilistic QRs (dashed) in
the absence of multiplexing for up to six nesting levels as a
function of the total distance, with different error parameters:
(a) F0 = 0.999, β = 0.0005 and δ = 0.0001; (b) F0 = 0.99,
β = 0.005 and δ = 0.001; (c)F0 = 0.98, β = 0.02 and δ = 0.01.
Other parameters are as in Fig. 8. In the encoded repeater
case, the secret key rate is calculated for the better of decoders












Bn+1 = 2(AnBn + CnDn),
Cn+1 = 2(AnCn +BnDn),
Dn+1 = 2(AnDn +BnCn). (31)
The initial state of the elementary links in our analysis
is given by Eq. (1). The successful probability for the ES







where pm is the reading and coupling efficiency of mem-
ories, which, for simplicity, here we assume pm = p. The






for Nprob = 2
n. Here, we assume the ES success proba-
bility is the same for all nesting levels. The normalized





where Pclick = η
2
d is the success probability for performing
QKD measurements (twofold coincidence), and
rprob∞ = r∞(Cn +Dn, Bn +Dn) (35)
at nesting level n.
One can similarly find out the corresponding key rate
equations in the case of multiplexed repeaters; see, for
instance, [5]. The results are very similar to that of
Fig. 8. For the sake of comparison that we are pursuing
in this paper, we obtain similar results if we use encoded
and probabilistic QRs both with, or without, multiplex-
ing. Given that, for early demonstrations of quantum
repeaters, quantum memories are quite precious, next
we compare the two systems only in the case of no mul-
tiplexing for which fewer memories are needed.
D. Optimal QRs in different parameter regions
Figure 9 shows the secret key rate for encoded and
probabilistic QRs for three sets of parameters. These
three sets represent different degrees of reliability for our
quantum gates and measurements. This mainly affects
the encoded repeater case, and we notice that, in all three
cases, the probabilistic QR (dashed lines) can only offer a
key up to nesting level four, while the encoded QR (solid
lines) can offer better rate-versus-distance scaling by us-
ing higher nesting levels. In Figs. 9(a) and (b), corre-
sponding to low-error and moderately-low-error regimes,
we notice that the QR with encoding offers higher key
generation rates than the probabilistic one. This advan-
tage increases with the nesting level to the point that,
at n = 4, the QR with encoding improves the key rate
by more than three orders of magnitude. In lower er-
ror regime with F0 = 0.999, β = 0.0005, δ = 0.0001, the
encoded QR can generate secret keys up to n = 6 cor-
responding to 64 elementary links. If we multiply the
number of QMs required at this nesting level by the nor-
malized key rate, the total key rate is ∼ 10−2 bits per
second at 10,000 km, which is comparable to what cur-
rently most advanced fiber-based QKD techniques can
achieve at distances below 1000 km [29, 30]. If the error
parameters are increased by one order of magnitude, as
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in Fig. 9(b), secret key can only be extracted up to n = 5
for encoded QRs, and the generated key will be reduced
by two orders of magnitude as compared to Fig. 9(a) at
n = 5. In the higher error regime, shown in Fig. 9(c), the
probabilistic QR shows better performance in most dis-
tances. This is mainly because of the errors involved in
the gates, which makes the use of error correction codes
less effective. In Fig. 9(c), the QR with three-qubit en-
coding can only generate secret keys up to n = 2 with
the specified error parameters. We conclude that the QR
with encoding will only be useful when the error rates are
moderately low.
The examples in Fig. 9 imply the existence of opera-
tion regions in which one or the other QR could offer a
better performance. In Figs. 10(a) and (b), we have, re-
spectively, specified these regions, at a fixed distance of
1000 km, for three-qubit and five-qubit repetition codes.
The choice of 1000 km corresponds to possibly near-
term implemetations of QR systems that outperform no-
repeater systems. In both figures, we have highlighted
which QR structure offers the higher key rate, if any, as
a function of our three error parameters 1 − F0, β, and
δ. We identify four regions in Figs. 10(a) and (b):
• Region 1: For low gate and measurement error proba-
bilities, when initial fidelity of Bell states is high, the
third nesting level of QRs with encoding dominates.
• Region 2: For the same region of gate and measurement
error probabilities, when initial fidelity becomes worse,
the second nesting level of QRs with encoding is more
favourable.
• Region 3: For slightly higher gate and measurement
error probabilities, the encoded QR loses its advantage,
and probabilistic QRs are the best option.
• Region 4: For high error probabilities and low initial
fidelity of the original entangled states, it is not possible
to generate a secure key with either of QR protocols.
It is interesting to note that the region that the three-
qubit code outperforms the probabilistic QR is larger
than that of the five-qubit code. In fact, by the time
that, according to Fig. 7, the five-qubit QR outperforms
the three-qubit one, both encoded QR structures perform
worse than the probabilistic repeater. This would sug-
gest then it is likely that the best error correction codes
for QKD purposes are the simplest ones, and it may not
be necessary to overcomplicate the system by employ-
ing larger codes. In fact, so long as QKD is concerned,
the practical choices seem to be between a probabilistic
structure for the quantum repeater versus the three-qubit
code in the encoded structure. We mention that we do
not consider all sources of imperfection in our analysis,
and it may be ill judged to rule out the possibility of
finding better codes. We should also note that, in our
comparison, we have not considered the third generation
of quantum repeaters, which rely on quantum error cor-
rection for handling both channel loss and gate errors.
FIG. 10. The region plots showing the distribution of the
optimal QR protocol in a three-dimensional parameter space
at Ltot = 1000km for (a) three-qubit repetition code and (b)
five-qubit repetition code. Other parameters are as in Fig. 8.
In the encoded repeater case, the secret key rate is calcu-
lated for the better of decoders 3 and 4 using our numerical
approximation method at Ntop = 20.
The requirements of such systems is much more strin-
gent than the ones we considered here, and, at least, in
the short term, our above conclusion may be the most
relevant one for physical implementation of the system.
Another interesting observation in Fig. 10(a) is that
the typical values required for 1− F0, β, and δ, in order
to offer an advantage over probabilistic repeaters, seems
to be quite within a feasible range. For the key error
parameter of β, up to 2% is acceptable, whereas for fi-
delity we are looking at lower ninety’s, which both seem
achievable with current technology. The measurement
error can also be kept below 1%. All in all, our analysis
suggests that extending the reach of trust-free terrestrial
QKD links to 1000 km is within reach in the near future.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we benchmarked the performance of a
QKD system that relied on quantum error correction for
entanglement distillation against probabilistic quantum
repeaters that do not necessarily use any additional dis-
tillation techniques. In order to improve system perfor-
mance and simplify its implementation requirements, in
the former case, we first proposed two decoding schemes
that did not need any two-qubit gates. This reduced
the decoding errors, as compared to conventional error-
correction decoders, and increased the resilience of the
system to common sources of error. In order to anal-
yse the system, we also developed several numerical and
analytical approximation techniques, and checked them
against exact results in certain cases. This allowed us
to study the performance of two codes from the fam-
ily of repetition codes. We interestingly found that, for
most practical purposes, the three-qubit system could
offer the best performance so long as error parameters
are around 1%. In higher error regimes, probabilistic
quantum repeaters could already offer better rates, or
secret key exchange was not at all possible. Our results
also shed new light into how encoded quantum repeaters
would compare with some other classes of quantum re-
peaters that relied on probabilistic entanglement distil-
lation techniques. We showed that for moderate to high
nesting levels the encoded setup could tolerate more er-
rors than the BDCZ protocol. We note that the exten-
sion of our decoding and approximation techniques are
in principle possible to larger codes, but, in the case of
QKD, this may not offer additional advantage. Based on
our analysis, it seems feasible to employ current technolo-
gies for quantum memories to demonstrate this encoded
class of repeaters.
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Appendix A: Equivalence of Decoders 2 and 3
In this Appendix, we prove that decoders 2 and 3, in
the ideal case, are equivalent. That would then allow us
to use the same security proof that we have for decoder 2,
i.e., that of entanglement-based BBM92 protocol [11], to
decoder 3 as well. In practice then, both decoders 2 and 3
implement the BBM92 protocol with erroneous decoders.
Given that these errors result in overestimating bit-flip
and phase-flip errors, we can still use the key rate formula
in Eq. (6) to obtain a lower bound on the secret key rate.
In order to prove our conjecture, we effectively show
that the measurement operators implemented, in the
ideal case, by either decoders are identical. We first write
down the perfect measurement operators for decoder 3
corresponding to measuring bit 0, or, equivalently, states
|0〉 in Z and |+〉 in X bases, as follows
M
(3)




+ = |+++〉〈+++|+ |+−−〉〈+−−|
+ | −+−〉〈−+−|+ | − −+〉〈− −+|, (A2)
respectively. The proof for bit 1 can similarly be done. In
order to show that the effective measurement operators
for decoder 2 are equivalent to Eq. (A1) and Eq. (A2),
we break the circuit of decoder 2 into two parts (see Fig.
2(b)): the first step includes two cnot operations and the
second step contains the corresponding measurements of
three qubits and the flip gate on the first qubit only if
the outputs of the other two qubits are |1〉. We look
at this process in a backward way and the corresponding
projectors right before the second part can be represented
as
Mmid0 = |000〉〈000|+ |001〉〈001|+ |010〉〈010|+ |111〉〈111|,
Mmid+ = |+ 00〉〈+00|+ |+ 01〉〈+01|
+ |+ 10〉〈+10|+ |+ 11〉〈+11|, (A3)
which implies the fact that for QKD measurement in Z
basis, the outputs of the second and the third qubits
will affect the result of the first qubit, while for QKD
measurement in X basis, the outputs of the other two
qubits does not matter. If we now go back to the input
stage of the decoder, where cnot1→2 and cnot1→3 are
applied subsequently, Eq. (A3) will be transformed to
M
(2)
0 = |000〉〈000|+ |001〉〈001|+ |010〉〈010|+ |100〉〈100|,
M
(2)
+ = (|000〉+ |111〉)(〈000|+ 〈111|)
+ (|001〉+ |110〉)(〈001|+ 〈110|)
+ (|010〉+ |101〉)(〈010|+ 〈101|)
+ (|011〉+ |100〉)(〈011|+ 〈100|) (A4)
Note that to calculate M
(2)
+ , we represent the first
qubit in {|0〉, |1〉} basis before applying the correspond-







+ , after writing all three qubits in {|+〉, |−〉} basis,




+ . The derivation steps are
straightforward and are left out. This proves our conjec-
ture.
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